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YSURSA AND DAVENPORT: PUTTING A DENT IN UNION ACCESS TO
MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
EDWARD J. SCHOEN∗
JOSEPH S. FALCHEK∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court put a significant dent in
the ability of unions to collect contributions for political activities from union members
through payroll deductions. In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n,1 the United States
Supreme Court in a six-to-three decision decided that an Idaho statute prohibiting
counties, municipalities, school districts and other local public employers from
providing payroll deductions for contributions by public employees to the union’s
political action committee did not violate the First Amendment.2 “Idaho’s law,” the
court ruled, “does not restrict political speech, but rather declines to promote that
speech by allowing public employee check-offs for political activities.”3 The state’s
decision to prohibit payroll deductions for political contributions, the Court
determined, was “reasonable in light of the State’s interest in avoiding the appearance
that carrying out the public’s business is tainted by partisan political activity.”4
In Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n,5 the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a
First Amendment challenge to a State of Washington statute that required public sector
labor unions to receive affirmative authorization from individuals who were not
members of the union but on whose behalf the union negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement before spending their agency fees for ideological or political purposes
unrelated to the union’s collective bargaining responsibilities.6 The Court ruled that the
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Pennsylvania.
1 Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 172 L. Ed. 2d 770 (2009).
2 Id. at 775.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007). The U.S. Supreme Court in
Davenport was unanimous in its judgment and partly unanimous in the opinion by Justice Scalia.
The Court was unanimous in Parts I and II-A; Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, did not join Part II-B because it resolved arguments raised for the first time in briefs
submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court.
6 The State of Washington in the interim amended the statute “to codify a narrower interpretation
of ‘use’ of agency-shop fees than the interpretation adopted below by the state trial court that
passed on that question.” The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court was not moot,
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affirmative authorization provisions did not violate the First Amendment.7 This
decision permits states to restrict political activities undertaken by public employee
unions by making the unions get the nonmembers’ affirmative consent before spending
mandatory fees for political purposes.8
Ysursa and Davenport supplement a long line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
dealing with the First Amendment implications of using union dues and fees for
political purposes contrary to the viewpoints of individuals compelled to pay them.
Those eight decisions,9 which were issued during the period 1956 to 1991, and which
examined the First Amendment implications of compelling membership in unions or
unions’ representation of workers in collective bargaining, the union’s use of dues and
fees for political or ideological purposes, and protection of the worker’s right not to be
associated with or contribute financially to the political speech of the union, provide
significant protection to workers who object to the use of their dues and fees for
political activities.
The purpose of this article is to examine the protections provided by the U.S.
Supreme Court to workers who object to the use of their dues and fees for political
purposes, and to determine whether Ysursa and Davenport indicate a willingness by the
U.S. Supreme Court to alter those protections. Part II of this article will catalogue the
major First Amendment protections provided by the eight decisions. Part III will
examine the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ysursa, and concludes that Ysursa does not
represent a major departure from the principles established in the eight decisions. Part
IV of this article will examine the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Davenport, and
concludes Davenport represents a departure from the principles established in the eight
decisions, and Part V of this article assesses the implications of Davenport’s departure
from the principles established in the eight decisions.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE USE OF
UNION DUES AND FEES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES
The major principles and protections spelled out by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
eight major decisions referred to above are summarized in the following sections. The
discussion begins with the constitutionality of the requirement to join a union.
A. COMPELLING WORKERS TO BECOME MEMBERS IN A UNION SHOP AS A CONDITION OF
EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE REPRESENTED BY A UNION FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
PURPOSES IN AN AGENCY SHOP DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Railway Employes’ Department v. Hanson,10 employees of the Union Pacific

however, because petitioners sought money damages for the alleged violation of the prior version
of the statute. Id. at 2377 n.1.
7 Id. at 2382.
8 Jess Bravin, High Court Allows a Curb on Union Political Activity, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2007, at A3.
9 Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 76 S. Ct. 714 (1956); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S.
Ct. 1784 (1961); Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 83 S. Ct. 1158 (1963); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Education, 97 S. Ct. 1762 (1977); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984);
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986); Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S.
Ct. 2228 (1990); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).
10 Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 76 S. Ct. 714 (1956).

Fall 2009/Ysura and Davenport/85

Railroad brought suit in Nebraska courts against the railroad and the labor
organizations representing employees of the railroad to enjoin the enforcement of a
union shop agreement, which required all employees of the railroad to become
members of the union within sixty days.11 The plaintiff employees were not members
of the union, did not want to become members of the union, and did not want to lose
their jobs and employments benefits if they refused to join the union.12 The employees
argued that the union shop arrangement authorized by the Railway Labor Act violated
the “right to work” provision of the Nebraska Constitution.13
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the union shop provisions of the Railway Labor
Act as a valid exercise by Congress of its powers under the Commerce Clause to
“regulate labor relations in interstate commerce,” “encourage the settlement of
disputes,” and achieve “[i]ndustrial peace along the arteries of commerce.”14 The U.S.
Supreme Court also ruled that the union shop arrangement did not violate the First
Amendment rights of the union members,15 noting that “there is no more an
infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case
of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar,”16 that the

Id. at 716. Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, authorized
union-shop agreements between interstate railroads and the unions of their employees. In the
union shop arrangement established by the Railway Labor Act, all workers were required to pay
union dues, initiation fees and assessments and to become members of the union as a condition of
continued employment within sixty days of their employment.
12 Id. The union shop arrangement authorized by Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, provided:
11

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, or of any other statute or
law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or
carriers as defined in this Act and a labor organization or labor organizations
duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with
the requirements of this Act shall be permitted (a) to make agreements,
requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days
following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such
agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of
the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no such
agreement shall require such conditions of employment with respect to
employees to whom membership is not available upon the same terms and
conditions as are generally applicable to any other member or with respect to
employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason
other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation
fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
Id. at 716 n.2.
13 Id. The Nebraska Constitution provides: “No person shall be denied employment because of
membership in or affiliation with, or resignation or expulsion from a labor organization or because
of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organization; nor shall any individual or corporation or
association of any kind enter into any contract, written or oral, to exclude persons from
employment because of membership in or nonmembership in a labor organization.” Id. at 716 n.1
(citing NEB. CONST. art XV, § 13).
14 Id. at 718-19.
15 Id. at 721.
16 Id.
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record contained nothing to demonstrate that mandatory membership in the union
impaired the union members’ freedom of expression,17 and that the statutory restriction
against any conditions upon membership in the union except for the payment of dues,
initiation fees, and assessments safeguarded the union members freedom of
expression.18 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “the requirement for financial
support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is
within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not violate . . . the
First Amendment.”19
The U.S. Supreme Court applied its holding in Hanson to an agency shop
arrangement in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.20 In Abood, the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously upheld a Michigan statute, which authorized union representation of state
and municipal employees in an “agency shop” arrangement (under which all
government workers are represented by the union even if they do not join the union),
and required the government workers represented by the union to pay a service charge
equal in amount to union dues to the union as a condition of employment.21 The Court
determined that the union’s assessment of such service charges against nonmembers to
finance collective bargaining, contract administration, and dispute resolution activities
did not violate the First Amendment rights of the non-member employees covered by
the collective bargaining agreement, but was constitutionally justified by the important
contribution of the agency shop arrangement to the system of labor relations
established by Congress.22
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed its holdings in Hanson and Abood that mandatory
union membership or representation does not violate the First Amendment in Keller v.

Id.
Id.
19 Id.
20 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1762 (1977). Some of the analysis of Abood reflected in this
section appeared in a prior article written by the authors of this article. See Edward J. Schoen et al.,
United Foods and Wileman Bros.: Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech – Now You See It,
Now You Don’t, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 476-77 (2002).
21 Abood, 97 S. Ct. at 1799-1800. See DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 30 (5th ed. 1990) (“The Court held that a law imposing compulsory service
charges, equivalent to union dues . . . on union members violated the First Amendment when those
charges were to be used for political or ideological purposes not related to the union’s role as a
collective bargaining agent.”).
22 Abood, 97 S. Ct. at 1794. The court noted:
17
18

The governmental interests advanced by the agency-shop provision in the
Michigan statute are much the same as those promoted by similar provisions
in federal labor law. The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival
teachers’ unions, holding quite different views as to the proper class hours,
class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and grievance procedures, each
sought to obtain the employer’s agreement, are no different in kind from the
evils that the exclusivity rule in the Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid
. . . . Thus, insofar as the service charge is used to finance expenditures by the
Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment, those two decisions of this Court appear to require
validation of the agency-shop agreement before us.
Id. at 1800.
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State Bar of California.23 In Keller, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that requiring
practicing lawyers to become member of the State Bar did not infringe on the First
Amendment right of freedom of association.24 Just as employees in union shops can be
required to join the union, an organization that engages in political actions, in order to
attain the benefits of bringing order to labor relations in railroad industry, so too can
the State of California require that lawyers practicing law in California join and pay
dues to their bar association, in order to obtain the benefits of regulating the practice of
law.25
B. EXPENDITURE OF DUES AND FEES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES VIOLATES
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF WORKERS WHO OBJECT TO SUCH EXPENDITURES
In International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street,26 members of a group of labor
organizations representing workers employed by the Southern Railway System in a
union shop arrangement,27 sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of the
collective bargaining agreement, because the unions expended member dues to finance
political campaigns of candidates for state and federal offices whom they opposed and
to promote political ideologies with which they disagreed.28 The U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that expenditures of union members’ dues without their consent to assist
candidates for public office or advance political causes compel the union members to
support political speech with which they may disagree, contrary to the First
Amendment.29 In contrast, unions could spend member dues to cover the expenses of
collective bargaining negotiation and administration and disposition of grievances and
disputes without the members’ consent, because those purposes fell immediately within
the reasons advanced by Congress in passing the Railway Labor Act through which
union shops were authorized in the railroad industry.30 The Court carefully reviewed
the history of union security in the railway industry and the legislative history of the
Railway Labor Act, and concluded “that § 2, Eleventh contemplated compulsory
unionism to force employees to share the costs of negotiating and administering
collective agreements, and the costs of the adjustment and settlement of disputes,”31
that Congress refrained from giving unions “unlimited power to spend exacted
money,”32 and that section 2, Eleventh, “is to be construed to deny the unions, over an

Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990). Much of the analysis of Keller reflected in
this section appeared in a prior article written by the authors of this article. See Schoen, supra note
20, at 476-77.
24 Id. at 2233.
25 Id. at 2233-34.
26 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S. Ct. 1784 (1961).
27 The union shop arrangement in Street, based on Section 2, Eleventh, was identical to the union
shop arrangement in Hudson discussed supra note 11. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S. Ct. at
1788 n.1.
28 Id. at 1787.
29 Id. at 1800.
30 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U. S. C. § 152, Eleventh. The union shop agreement permitted by the Railway
Labor Act required employees of railroads to pay union dues, initiation fees and assessments as a
condition of gaining and continuing their employment. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S. Ct.
at 1787.
31 Id. at 1797.
32 Id. at 1800.
23
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employee’s objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes
which he opposes.”33
The U.S. Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in dealing with the agency
shop arrangement in Abood.34 In Abood, several teachers alleged that the union engaged
in economic and political activities that they did not approve, and used service fees they
were required to pay under the agency shop arrangement to support those activities.35

Id. In Comm’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court reached
the same conclusion: the union was prohibited from spending dues and fees for political purposes
to which nonmembers objected under the National Labor Relations Act Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.S. §
158(a)(3). The National Labor Relations Act Section 8(a)(3) is the equivalent of Section 2, Eleventh
under the Railway Labor Act. As amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, or Taft
Hartley Act, 29 U. S. C. §158(a)(3), the National Labor Relations Act permits the employer and the
exclusive bargaining representative to agree that all employees in the bargaining unit must pay
periodic dues and fees as a condition of continued employment, and prohibits any discrimination
in hiring or terms of employment against an employee for nonmembership in the union except for
the payment of dues and initiation fees. Relying on Street, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Beck
that Section 8(a)(3) prohibits a union, over the objections of nonmembers who have paid their dues,
to spend objecting nonmember dues on activities unrelated to collective bargaining activities. Id. at
2657. Unlike Street, however, the basis of the Court’s decision in Beck was the language in the
statute, not the First Amendment. This disparity troubles one commentator:
33

In determining whether sufficient state action exists to trigger First
Amendment protection for private-sector cases arising under the RLA or the
NLRA, the Court appears to have two positions. For cases premised on the
RLA, the Court conceded that Hanson determined ‘that because the RLA preempts all state laws banning union-security agreements, the negotiation and
enforcement of such provisions in railroad industry contracts involves
‘governmental action’ and is therefore subject to constitutional limitations.’
For cases arising under the NLRA, the Court has stated that it is simply not
required to decide that issue. While solicitous regarding First Amendment
issues, the Court appears to prefer to escape grounding its decisions in the
Constitution. Instead, it works around the Constitution and discovers an
alternative basis for granting relief to dues objectors or rules against them. In
the Beck case, for instance, the Court found that the duty of fair representation
constituted a sufficient basis to grant dues objector’s relief despite the District
court’s determination that ‘[the] disbursement of agency fees for purposes
other than bargaining unit representation violated the associational and free
speech right of objecting nonmembers.
Harry G. Hutchinson, Reclaiming the First Amendment Through Union Dues Restrictions?, 10 U. PA. J.
BUS. & EMP. L. 663, 695 (2008).
34 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1762 (1977). Some of the analysis of Abood reflected in this
section appeared in a prior article written by the authors of this article. See Schoen, supra note 20, at
476-77.
35 Abood, 97 S. Ct. at 1788. Under the agency shop clause, teachers were not required to become
members of the union. Teachers who did not become members of the union, however, were
required within sixty days of hire to pay the union a service charge equal in amount to the regular
dues paid by union members. Teachers who did not pay the service charge were discharged from
employment. Id. at 1788. Under the National Labor Relations Act, regulation of the labor relations
of state and local governments is left to the states, and Michigan permitted employees of local
government units to exercise the same rights as those protected by Federal law: the right to self
organization, to bargain collectively, and to use secret ballots in representation elections. Id. at
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The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the union was prohibited from requiring an
employee to pay dues and fees to support of an ideological cause he or she may oppose
as a condition of holding a job as a public school teacher.36 The Court reasoned that the
First Amendment protects the right of individuals to refuse to associate with others and
to refuse to contribute funds to associations that advance ideas and promote beliefs, and
that those First Amendment protections are not surrendered by virtue of public
employment.37 Hence, the state cannot under the First Amendment mandate
association with a political point of view as a condition of retaining public
employment.38 The Court emphasized, however, that its decision did not prohibit the
union from spending money to advance political or ideological viewpoints or promote
the candidacy of individuals to public office.39 Those expenditures, however, must be
financed by the dues and fees paid by union members who neither object to nor are not
coerced to support those viewpoints by the threat of loss of public sector employment.40
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed the First Amendment protection
against expenditure of dues for political purposes without the consent of the member in
Keller v. State Bar of California.41 In Keller, members of the State Bar of California objected
to the use of a portion of their mandatory membership dues to support political and
ideological activities with which they disagreed.42 The U.S. Supreme Court determined
that the relationship between the California State Bar and its members was substantially
analogous to the relationship between a union and its members.43 This permitted the
Court to apply the Abood analysis to the State Bar’s use of member dues,44 and to
conclude that the First Amendment prohibits the State Bar from spending member dues
on political or ideological activities unless those expenditures are necessarily or
reasonably incurred to regulate the legal profession or improve the quality of legal
services.45 It was also entirely appropriate that lawyers who benefited from their
admission to the practice of law before the courts should be required to pay a fair share
of the costs of regulating the legal profession and enhancing the educational and ethical

1793.
36 Id. at 1799-1800.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. (“We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for expression of political
views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not
germane to its duties as a collective bargaining representative.”) In making these political
expenditures, the union must act “consistently with any applicable (and constitutional) system of
election campaign regulation.” Id. at 1800 n.32.
40 Id. at 1800.
41 Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990). Much of the analysis of Keller reflected in
this section appeared in a prior article written by the authors of this article. See Schoen, supra note
20, at 476-77.
42 Id. at 2231.
43 Id. at 2235.
44 Id. at 2235-36.
45 Id. The Court also notes that compliance with Abood and Keller is neither difficult nor
burdensome. Rather, the constitutional requirements for the collection and use of fees are
providing an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to
challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decision maker, and an escrow for the amounts
reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending. Id. at 2237; accord Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1076 n.17 (1986).
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standards of the admitted lawyers.46
C. UNION MEMBERS WHO OBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF DUES FOR POLITICAL OR
IDEOLOGICAL PURPOSES AND WHO ARE CURRENT IN THE PAYMENT OF THEIR DUES ARE
ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF THOSE DUES PLUS APPROPRIATE INTEREST, AND THE BURDEN
OF ESTABLISHING THE AMOUNT TO BE REFUNDED IS IMPOSED ON THE UNION
In Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen,47 employees of the Southern Railway
Company, who, like the employees in Street, were obligated to pay dues, fees and
assessments to various labor organizations as a condition of their continuing
employment in a union shop arrangement, obtained an injunction against the
enforcement of the labor agreement, because the union used the collected dues to lobby
for and against legislation, to influence votes in public elections, and to make campaign
contributions.48 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled the injunction contained four fatal flaws.
First, the injunction covered all workers, not just those who objected to the
expenditures.49 Second, the injunction covered all union dues, not just those dues used
for political purposes thereby interfering with the union’s ability to undertake collective
bargaining activities.50 Third, the injunction was issued without any determination by
the union of the percentage of union dues used for political purposes,51 the burden of
proof of which rests with the union.52 Fourth, the injunction should have directed the
union to refund that portion of the collected funds in the same proportion that the
union’s political expenditures bear to total union expenditures, and to reduce future
collections of dues and fees by the same proportion.53
The Court’s holding in Allen was affirmed in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks.54
In Ellis, clerical employees of Western Airlines objected to the use of assessed agency
fees (equal in amount to union member dues) in support of political activities, and
challenged the adequacy of the rebate procedures implemented by the union to
reimburse them for that portion of their agency fees used for those purposes.55 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the rebate scheme employed by the union was inadequate,
because the collection and utilization of union fees for improper purposes followed by a
rebate of those improper expenditures amounts to “an involuntary loan for purposes to
which the employee objects.”56 Because readily available and convenient means exist to
ameliorate the wrongful though temporary use of the funds (e.g., advanced reduction of
dues or interest bearing escrow accounts), the union’s temporary use of the funds for
improper purposes violates the statute.57 In other words, the union was required to

Id. at 2236.
Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 83 S. Ct. 1158 (1963).
48 Id. at 1160.
49 Id. at 1162.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1163.
52 Id. at 1164.
53 Id.
54 Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984).
55 Id. at 1888, 1888 n.3. The clerical workers did not object to their mandatory union membership
required by the union shop arrangement; that claim was precluded by Railway Employees v.
Hanson, 76 S. Ct. 714 (1956). See Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1887.
56 Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1890.
57 Id.
46
47
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provide more than a “pure” rebate remedy that permits it to expend fees for political
purposes and then later refund that portion of the fee to the worker. The union must
either pay interest on the amount refunded or provide a mechanism to permit the
worker to reduce his service fee payments prospectively by the portion employed for
political ideological purposes.58
The U.S. Supreme Court further amplified the refund remedy that unions must
provide to objecting workers in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson.59 In Hudson, several
workers represented by the union objected to the use of their dues for purposes not
related to collective bargaining and challenged the procedure implemented by the
union to handle their objections.60 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the procedures
enacted by the union to deal with nonmember objections were inadequate for three
reasons. First, the union was permitted to use the objectors’ dues temporarily for
purposes to which they objected, rather than preliminarily obtaining their consent to
finance activities unrelated to collective bargaining.61 Second, the procedures failed to
provide nonmembers with sufficient information about the basis on which the
proportionate share was calculated in advance of their raising an objection; instead, the
union provided information about the calculation of the proportionate share after the
objectors filed their objections.62 Further, the information ultimately provided to the
objectors was inadequate, because it failed to disclose the expenditures for collective
bargaining and administration that benefited all members and nonmembers alike and
for which a fee could be charged; the mere disclosure of a percentage of expenditures
does not explain why they were required to pay dues.63 Third, the procedure failed to
provide “a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decision maker.”64 The Court
noted that, because the agency shop arrangement effects an infringement on First
Amendment rights of association,65 the nonunion employee “is entitled to have his

Id.
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
60 Id. at 1071.
61 Id. at 1075.
62 Id. at 1075-76.
63 Id. at 1076. Notably, the Court prefaced its determination that insufficient information was
provided to the nonmembers by reiterating its language in Abood placing the burden of proof on the
union. The court noted:
58
59

In Abood, we reiterated that the nonunion employee has the burden of raising
an objection, but that the union retains the burden of proof: ‘Since the unions
possess the facts and records from which the proportion of political to total
union expenditures can reasonably be calculated, basic considerations of
fairness compel that they, not the individual employees, bear the burden of
proving such proportion.’ Basic considerations of fairness, as well as concern
for the First Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that the potential
objectors be given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s
fee. Leaving the nonunion employees in the dark about the source of the
figure for the agency fee - and requiring them to object in order to receive
information - does not adequately protect the careful distinctions drawn in
Abood.
Id. at 1075-76 (citations omitted).
64 Id. at 1076.
65 Id. at 1076 n.20 (citing Ellis, 466 U.S. at 455).
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objections addressed in expeditious, fair, and objective manner.”66 The procedure
employed by the union did not meet this standard, because it permitted the union, an
interested party, to control the process from the moment the process begins (collection
of the dues), through the two-step appeal process (controlled by the union executive
committee and union executive board), and through the final arbitration (decided by a
union-selected arbitrator).67 In sum, “the original Union procedure was inadequate,
because it failed to minimize the risk that nonunion employees’ contributions might be
used for impermissible purposes, because it failed to provide adequate justification for
the advance reduction of dues, and because it failed to offer a reasonably prompt
decision by an impartial decisionmaker.”68
Notably, then, Hudson requires the union to make significant disclosures to
employees so that they can make an informed decision to object to the expenditures of
dues and fees for purposes not related to collective bargaining, contract administration,
and grievance adjustment. More particularly, the union must inform the employees (1)
how it calculated the proportion of expenditures for activities unrelated to collective
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment, and (2) the nature of
expenditures included under the category of collective bargaining and contract
administration that benefited members and nonmembers alike.69 Further, the union’s
disclosure of this information must be made before the employee is given the
opportunity to object to expenditure of dues and fees for purposes not related to
collective bargaining and contract administration. As discussed in Part IV below, those
protections were not provided by the union to employees in Davenport, a shortcoming
overlooked by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision.
D. THE UNION’S ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE CHARGES AGAINST NONMEMBERS IN AN
AGENCY SHOP DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF WORKERS WHO
WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE UNION TO THE EXTENT THOSE FEES ARE EXPENDED FOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION PURPOSES
In Ellis, the U.S. Supreme Court also addressed the nature of expenses that may
properly be paid from union dues and service charges. The test employed by the Court
to determine the propriety of these expenditures was “whether the challenged

Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1076.
Id. at 1076-77.
68 Id. at 1077. The U.S. Supreme Court also rejected the Union’s argument that the implementation
of an escrow arrangement through which 100% of the dues of objecting nonmembers were held
intact pending resolution of the member’s objection was sufficient, because, while it prevented the
improper use of objector’s dues, it failed to satisfy the second (adequate explanation of the use of
fees) and third (prompt decision) criteria. Id.
69 One commentator debunked the effectiveness and truthfulness of these disclosures:
66
67

[L]abor unions aware of judicial precedent have an incentive to shield
ideological and other nonrepresentational expenditures from scrutiny. A
truthful response to the question of which expenditures are expended
impermissibly may deprive unions of such funds. Unions have reason to blur
the lines between germane and nongermane expenditures by suggesting that
all expenditures are required to fulfill their collective-bargaining role.
Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 694.
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expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the
duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on
labor-management issues.”70 Notably, under this test:
[O]bjecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of
not only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a
collective-bargaining contract and of settling grievances and
disputes, but also the expenses of activities or undertakings
normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the
duties of the union as exclusive representative of the employees at
the bargaining unit.71
Hence, objecting employees may be required to pay fees to the union to support
the direct costs of collective bargaining activities and those activities that are normally
and reasonably employed to carry out those collective bargaining activities. Using that
test, the Court concluded that the following expenses are sufficiently related to
collective bargaining to be paid from union dues: (1) travel expenses to attend national
conventions during which officers are elected and guidance on collective bargaining is
provided; (2) refreshments for members during business meetings and social activities;
(3) publications which inform union members about negotiations, contract demands,
employee benefits, proposed legislation, and recreational and social activities; and (4)
litigation expenses related to negotiating and administering the collective bargaining
agreement and settling grievances.72 The Court also determined that the expenses
related to organizing and recruiting additional union members were not sufficiently
related to collective bargaining activities to be paid from union dues, and refrained
from expressing an opinion on the death benefits paid to union members, because the
record was unclear whether or not the objecting employees were entitled to receive the
death benefits.73
In Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n,74 the U.S. Supreme Court amplified its decision in
Ellis. In Lehnert, faculty members employed by Ferris State College, a state-related
public institution of higher education supported by the State of Michigan, objected to

Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1892.
Id.
72 Id. at 1892-95. The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed the conclusion that litigation expenses
were chargeable expenses in its unanimous decision:
70
71

[C]osts of that litigation are chargeable provided the litigation meets the
relevant standards for charging other national expenditures that the Lehnert
majority enunciated. Under those standards, a local union may charge a
nonmember an appropriate share of its contribution to a national's litigation
expenses if (1) the subject matter of the national litigation bears an
appropriate relation to collective bargaining and (2) the arrangement is
reciprocal -- that is, the local's payment to the national affiliate is for services
that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by
virtue of their membership in the parent organization.
Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798, 806 (2009)
73 Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1893, 1895.
74 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).
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the expenditures of funds by the Ferris Faculty Association, the exclusive bargaining
representative of the faculty in an agency shop arrangement.75 The objecting faculty
members claimed that the expenditures in question were used for purposes other than
negotiating and administering the collective bargaining agreement, thereby violating
their First Amendment Rights.76 The U.S. Supreme Court initiated its analysis by
summarizing Hanson, Street, Allen, Abood, and Ellis as follows:
[C]hargeable activities must (1) be ‘germane’ to collective-bargaining
activity; (2) be justified by the government’s vital policy interest in
labor peace and avoiding ‘free riders’; and (3) not significantly add
to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of
an agency or union shop.77
The Court in its plurality opinion then resolved the six categories of payments
challenged by the dissenting employees, and decided dissenting union members’ dues
could properly be expended on: (1) the “pro rata share of the costs associated with
otherwise chargeable activities of the state and national affiliates, even if those activities
were not performed for the direct benefit of the objecting employees’ bargaining unit”78;
(2) the expenses of attending and participating in union conventions, because
“bargaining strategies and representational policies” are developed at those meetings
and those activities are “essential to the union’s discharge of its duties as bargaining
agent”79; and (3) the expenses of preparing for a strike, even if the strike is illegal,
because those expenses “aid [collective bargaining] negotiations and inure to the direct
benefit of members of the dissenters’ unit” and do not further burden their First
Amendment rights.80
The Court also decided that the following expenses could not be paid by dissenting
members’ dues: (1) lobbying and political activities “outside the limited context of
contract ratification or implementation,” because such expenditures “use each dissenter
as ‘an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable’”81; (2) public education programs through publications of the union,
because the union did not demonstrate how the public education programs was
“oriented toward the ratification or implementation of petitioners’ collective-bargaining
agreement”82; and (3) public relations expenses incurred to enhance the reputation and

Id. at 1955-56.
Id. at 1956.
77 Id. at 1959. The Court rejected a more stringent test that required “a direct relationship between
the expense at issue and some tangible benefit to the dissenters’ bargaining unit.” Id. at 1961. One
commentator observed that the refusal to adopt the more stringent test “has consequences because
it may encourage subsequent courts to conclude that a union does not act unlawfully by charging
expenses that are for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local
union . . . . This may be a mistake ‘because virtually any activity may ultimately inure to the benefit
of members.’” See Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 690.
78 Id. at 1961. See Locke, supra note 72 (deciding unanimously that the local union’s share of the
national's litigation expenses are chargeable, and thereby affirming the plurality determination in
Lehnert).
79 Id. at 1965.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1960-61.
82 Id. at 1963.
75
76
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standing of public school teachers and their profession, because they “entailed speech
of a political nature in a public forum,” were not “sufficiently related to the union’s
collective bargaining functions to justify compelling dissenting employees to support
it,” and imposed a “substantially greater burden upon First Amendment rights.”83
III. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN YSURSA
In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n,84 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that an
Idaho statute entitled “Voluntary Contributions Act,” which prohibited the use of
payroll deductions for political activities from wages of employees of the state and its
political divisions, did not violate the First Amendment.85 Labor organizations
challenged the constitutionality of the statute before it went into effect.86 The District
court rejected the labor unions’ argument with respect to the state, but upheld their
challenge with respect to local governments.87 Analogizing the relationship between
the State and its political subdivisions to that between the State and a regulated private
utility,88 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals treated the prohibition on payroll
deductions at the local level as a content-based restriction on speech, applied strict
scrutiny, and held the statute unconstitutional as applied at the local level.89 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether “the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibit[s] a state legislature from removing the authority of

Id. at 1964.
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 172 L. Ed. 2d 770 (2009).
85 Id. at 775.
86 Id. at 776.
87 Id.
88 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public
Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) in reaching its conclusion that the
relationship between the State and its political subdivisions was analogous to that between the
State and regulated public utilities. Ysursa, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 777, 780. In Consolidated Edison, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that an order of the New York Public Service Commission prohibiting the
inclusion of utility company inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy in its monthly
bills violated the First Amendment. Noting that corporations are entitled to freedom of speech, the
Court ruled that none of the interests advanced by the Commission - protecting the utility’s
customers from having views forced upon them, allocating limited space in the billing envelopes in
the public interest, and ensuring ratepayers do not subsidize the cost of the bill inserts - was a
compelling state interest justifying the prohibition on the utility company’s speech. Billed
customers were a “captive audience,” but they could simply toss the insert away in the
wastebasket; billing envelopes were not, unlike broadcast frequencies, part of a scarce, publicly
owned resource; and there was no basis to assume the Commission could not exclude the costs of
the bill inserts from the utility’s rate base.
The U.S. Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of California, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986). In Pacific Gas, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that the order of the California Public Utilities Commission requiring Pacific Gas and
Electric Co. (PG&E) to include communications prepared by a public interest organization in its
billing envelopes violated the First Amendment rights of PG&E, because PG&E was required to use
its own property to disseminate the views of others with which it disagrees contrary to the First
Amendment.
89 Ysursa 172 L. Ed. 2d at 777. See Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heidemen, 504 F.3d 1053, 1059 (2007).
Neither party challenged the District Court’s determination with respect to state level employees.
Ysursa, 172 L. Ed. 2d. at 776.
83
84
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state political subdivisions to make payroll deductions for political activities under a
statute that is concededly valid as applied to state government employers.”90
In response to the labor union’s argument that the Idaho statute employed a
content-based restriction and hence was subject to strict scrutiny,91 the U.S. Supreme
Court noted that the state is “not required to assist others in funding the expression of
particular ideas, including political ones,”92 and that Davenport confirms the state’s right
to decline to assist political speech by collecting political contributions via payroll
deduction in the absence of the specific consent of the worker.93 Similarly, “Idaho does
not suppress political speech but simply declines to promote it through public
employer checkoffs for political activities.”94
Acknowledging that payroll deductions “enhance the unions’ exercise of First
Amendment rights” and that the Idaho elimination of payroll deductions made it more
difficult for the union to raise funds for political activities,95 the Court noted that
Idaho’s decision not to provide payroll deductions for political activities is not an
abridgment of the unions' speech, because the unions “are free to engage in such speech
as they see fit. They simply are barred from enlisting the State in support of that
endeavor.”96 Hence, the Court concluded, Idaho's decision to prohibit payroll
deductions "is not subject to strict scrutiny,"97 and Idaho “need only demonstrate a
rational basis to justify the ban on political payroll deductions.”98 A sufficient rational
basis exists at the state level, the Court noted, in the state’s interest in avoiding the
“appearance of government favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics.”99
Because municipal organizations are merely "subordinate governmental
instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental
functions,"100 the same rational basis exists at the political subdivision level: states may
prohibit payroll deductions of political contributions to advance the state’s interest “in
separating the operation of government from partisan politics.”101 Having concluded
the state demonstrated a sufficient rational basis for its decision to eliminate payroll
deductions at the local level, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.102

The question presented appears in the docket of U.S. Supreme Court, at http://origin.www.
supremecourtus.gov/qp/07-00869qp.pdf, (last visited March 17, 2009) (original in possession of
Edward J. Schoen). The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted on March 31, 2008. See docket of
U.S. Supreme Court, accessed on March 19, 2009, at
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-869.htm (last visited March 17, 2009) (original
in possession of Edward J. Schoen).
91 Ysursa, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 777.
92 Id. (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (noting that
Congress can decide that tax-exempt organizations should not further benefit at the expense of
taxpayers at large by obtaining a further subsidy for lobbying)).
93 Ysursa, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 779.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 777.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 778.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 779.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 780.
102 Id. at 781. By reversing the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved inconsistent rulings
90
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Ysursa appears to be a fairly straight-forward decision garnering the votes of both
liberal and conservative justices103 and demonstrating simply that “the legal
controversy” over upholding paycheck protection “was more contrived than real.”104
The biggest downfall from the decision, it appears, is the diminished ability of unions to
raise political activities contributions via payroll deduction and the increased burden
imposed on the union to solicit and collect those contributions directly from its
members.105
Notably, Ysursa does not appear to represent a departure from the principles and
protections provided to workers who do not wish their dues and fees to be used for
political purposes to which they object. Their First Amendment freedom of association

rendered by three federal circuit courts of appeal and an Ohio appellate court dealing with almost
identical state statutes. See Jay E. Grenig, May a State Legislature Prohibit State Political Subdivisions
from Making Payroll Deductions for Political Activities?, 2 ABA PREVIEW 113 (2008). Grenig writes:
Both the Ninth Circuit in Pocatello Education Association and the Tenth
Circuit in Utah Education Association v. Shurtleff, 512 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir.
2008), held a statutory prohibition of payroll deductions for political activities
to be unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit in Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v.
Pizza, 154 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998), has held a similar statute to be
constitutional. In a state-court decision, the Ohio Court of Appeals held a
statute prohibiting payroll deductions for political activities was
unconstitutional because, “The prohibition on direct partisan political
expression by labor organizations strikes at the core of the electoral process
and constitutional freedom of speech.”
Id. at 116.
Chief Justice Roberts authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito joined. Justice Ginsburg joined as to Parts I and III, and also filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
104 See M. Royce Van Tassell, “Taxpayers shouldn’t have to subsidize political donations for
unions,” DESERT MORNING NEWS, March 8, 2009, at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb
=21_T6049667705&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T604966
7712&cisb=22_T6049667711&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=164282&docNo=1 (last visited
March 16,2009) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen).
105 See Wendy Leonard, DESERT MORNING NEWS, February 25, 2009, at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/
lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T6049667705&format=GNBF
I&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T6049667712&cisb=22_T6049667711&tree
Max=true&treeWidth=0&csi=164282&docNo=7 (last visited March 16, 2009) (original in possession
of Edward J. Schoen) (“During the one year that the Voluntary Contributions Act was in effect in
Utah, the UEA political-action committee’s fundraising fell 75 percent, and the Utah Public
Employee Association political action committee’s fundraising dropped to zero.”). A spokesman
for the Idaho Education Association expressed disappointment, but said the union has “moved on.”
See Mark Welsh, “Supreme Court Backs Idaho's Payroll-Deduction Curb,” EDUC. WK., March 4,
2009, at http://www.lexisnexis.com/
us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T6049667705&format=G
NBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T6049667712&cisb=22_T6049667711
&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=313401&docNo=8 (last visited March 19, 2009) (original in
possession of Edward J. Schoen) (“[I]n in the wake of the passage of the 2003 law, IEA members
moved away from payroll deductions and toward electronic funds transfer as a means of making
their political donations.”).
103
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is not affected. There is no indication worker contributions to the union’s politicalaction committee were deducted from their wages without their consent. There was no
wrongful retainer of contributions or failure to provide prompt refunds with interest of
political activities contributions erroneously deducted. There was no indication the
contributions obtained via payroll deduction were expended for unauthorized
purposes. Hence, Ysursa is fairly unremarkable in so far as the canon of principles
governing political use of union dues and fees.
IV. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN DAVENPORT
As noted above in the introduction to this article, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n106 upheld a Washington State statute that
required public sector labor unions to obtain affirmative authorizations from employees
in a agency shop who were not members of the union but were required to pay service
fees to the union before spending those fees for political purposes to which the
employees objected.107 The State of Washington permitted the unions to charge
nonmembers a service fee equal in amount to the union dues it collected from members;
both the service fee and the union dues were collected via payroll deduction.108
Further, because the service fee was the same amount as the union dues, the service fee
collected necessarily exceeded the costs of collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment.109 The union sent “Hudson packets” to all
nonmembers twice a year, in which they asked the nonmembers to select one of three
options: agree to pay the full agency fee within thirty days, object to payment of
nonchargeable expenses and receive a rebate calculated by the union, or object to
payment of nonchargeable expenses and receive a rebate calculated by an arbitrator.110
These arrangements permitted the nonmembers to “opt out” from the payment of
excess service fees, rather than permitting them to “opt in” to the payment of excess
service fees.111
Contending that these arrangements failed to meet the affirmative authorization
requirements of the statute, the State of Washington filed suit against the union, and
several nonmembers of the union initiated a separate class action lawsuit against the
union to recover union expenditures for political purposes.112 The trial court in the
State of Washington action decided the union failed to comply with the affirmative
authorization requirements, and awarded the State money and injunctive relief.113 The
trial court in the nonmembers’ action found in favor of the nonmembers and certified

Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007).
Id. at 2383. The statute provided: “A labor organization may not use agency shop fees paid by
an individual who is not a member of the organization to make contributions or expenditures to
influence an election or to operate a political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the
individual. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760.
108 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377.
109 Erik S. Jaffe, Campaign Finance and Free Speech: When Easy Cases Make Bad Law: Davenport v.
Washington Education Association, 2006-2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 115, 116.
110 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
111 See Jaffe, supra note 109, at 117.
112 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378.
113 Id.
106
107
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the class.114 After intermediate appellate proceedings, the Washington Supreme Court
ruled (1) agency fee jurisprudence attempts to establish a balance between the First
Amendment rights of the nonmembers and the First Amendment rights of the union,
and (2) the affirmative authorization requirements of the statute interfered with that
balance and violated the First Amendment right of the union.115 The Court reasoned
that the burden of objecting to the expenditure should be shouldered by the
nonmembers rather than the union.116 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
of Washington relied on language in Street that a union member’s dissent from the use
of union dues for political purposes should not be presumed. Rather, the dissenting
member should make his or her dissent known to the union.117
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari118 and decided that the Washington
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the agency fee cases missed the mark. With respect
to the Washington Supreme Court’s reliance on the language in Street that dissent is not
to be presumed, the U.S. Supreme Court insisted that language “meant only that it
would be improper for a court to enjoin the expenditure of the agency fees of all
employees, including those who had not objected, when the statutory or constitutional
limitation established in those cases could be satisfied by a narrower remedy.”119
The U.S. Supreme Court also disagreed with the Washington Supreme Court
determination that unions have a First Amendment right to utilize service fees for
political purposes. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court insisted, “unions have no
constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees,” and the First
Amendment is not “implicated whenever governments place limitations on the union’s
entitlement to agency fees above and beyond what Abood and Hudson require.”120
In the U.S. Supreme Court’s view, Hudson provides “a minimum set of procedures
by which a [public sector] union in an agency-shop relationship could meet its
requirements under Abood,” and the fact that the State of Washington “required more

Id.
Id.
116 Id. at 2379.
117 See State of Washington v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 130 P.3d 352, 358-59 (2006). See Patrice
Wade DiPietro, Authorization Required For Certain Union Spending, 9 LAW. J. 2 (2007) (“[The
Washington Supreme Court] concluded that Section 760 was unconstitutional because it believed
that agency-fee cases, having balanced the constitutional rights of unions and nonmembers,
dictated that a nonmember must shoulder the burden of objecting before a union can be barred
from spending nonmember fees for impermissible purposes [under Abood]. The court also reached
its conclusion by stating that dissent is not to be presumed - - it must affirmatively be made known
to the union by the dissenting employee.”).
118 That the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari surprised at least one commentator. “The Court
granted certiorari, even though the State of Washington had modified its statute, few other states
had similar provisions, and there was no apparent circuit conflict. Perhaps the Court just wanted to
deprive the union of a victory, or maybe it just did not have many cases to occupy its time.”
Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s 2006-2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A Quiet But Revealing
Term, 11 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y 219, 248-49 (2007).
119 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379. See DiPietro, supra note 117 (“The court opined that the lower court
read far too much into its admonition that ‘dissent is not to be presumed,’ clarifying that it only
meant that it would be improper for a court to enjoin the expenditure of the agency fees of all
employees, including those who had not objected, when statutory or constitutional requirements
could be satisfied by a narrower remedy.”).
120 Id. Citing Lincoln Fed. Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 334 U.S. 525, 529-31 (1949), the
U.S. Supreme Court noted that the State of Washington could eliminate the agency fee entirely. Id.
114
115
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than the Hudson minimum does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny.”121 In other
words, the minimum requirements imposed by Hudson are the “constitutional floor” for
expending agency fees, and Hudson’s minimum requirements are not “a constitutional
ceiling for state-imposed restrictions,” which trigger First Amendment review.122 Thus,
while the Hudson language suggests that requiring parties to opt out is the proper
course of action, it is not a constitutional requirement.123 Hence, state legislatures can
further restrict (and indeed eliminate entirely) the union’s entitlement to use the dues
and fees of nonmembers beyond the requirements of Abood and Hudson without
violating the First Amendment. Quite simply, the union is entitled to collect agency
fees from nonmembers only because the State of Washington compelled nonmembers
to pay those fees, and the requirement that nonmembers consent to the expenditure of
collected fees for political purpose to which the nonmembers object is simply a
condition imposed on the union’s entitlement to spend “other people’s money,”124 and in
no way restricts the union right to expend funds for political purposes.125
Four aspects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision deserve attention. First, the U.S.
Supreme Court stressed that its decision applied only to public-sector unions and not
private-sector unions, even though the language of the Washington statute “applies on
its face to both public- and private-sector unions in Washington.”126

Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. at 2379. The curt language employed by the
Court caused a sympathetic response from one commentator: “Reading the opinion, one comes
away feeling a bit sorry for the union. The tone of the opinion seemed to chide the union for daring
to complain about restrictions on fees it had no right to in the first place. . . . Indeed, the case
manifests a certain hostility to unions and their gumption, which was evident by the Court taking
the case in the first place.” Selmi, supra note 118, at 251.
122 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
123 See Selmi, supra note 118, at 249. Selmi writes:
121

[T]he Hudson language suggested that requiring parties to opt out of the
agency fees would be the proper course, but what the language did not
indicate is whether that was a constitutional requirement. Based on the
language from Hudson, it would be constitutionally problematic for a court to
invalidate an opt-out requirement, but the question posed in this case was
whether a state legislature could mandate an opt-in requirement. To the
Court, that was a very different question. As the Court explained, “the mere
fact that Washington required more than the Hudson minimum does not
trigger First Amendment scrutiny. The constitutional floor for union’s
collection and spending of agency fees is not also a constitutional ceiling for
state-imposed restrictions.”
Id.
Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380. One commentator criticizes the U.S. Supreme Court for not going
farther and upholding the Washington State statute on the grounds it better protects the First
Amendment rights of the objecting members: “I think the dispositive consideration is that not only
did the Union lack any ‘right’ to the excess fees, but in fact the First Amendment rights of the
nonmember employees precluded the state from giving the Union the power to compel even the
initial payment of such excess fees.” See Jaffe, supra note 109, at 122.
125 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380 n.2.
126 Id. at 2382 (“We emphasize an important limitation upon our holding: we uphold § 760 only as
applied to public-sector unions such as respondent. Section 760 applies on its face to both publicand private-sector unions in Washington. Since private-sector unions collect agency fees through
contractually required action taken by private employers rather than by government agencies,
124
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Second, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Davenport and the Washington statute
affect only those fees paid by employees who are not members of the union; they do not
affect the union’s ability to access and spend the dues of its own members.127 During
the period 1996 to 2000, Washington Education Association (WEA) had approximately
3,500 nonmembers per year, about five percent of the total number of persons
represented by WEA.128 The decision will not affect the 70,000 or so members of
WEA.129
Third, Davenport permitted the State of Washington to restrict the union’s
expenditures for political purposes solely from the dues or fees of the workers who
affirmatively “opt in” by approving the payment beforehand.130 In contrast, the cases

Washington’s regulation of those private arrangements presents a somewhat different
constitutional question.”). In making this distinction, the Court also hinted that the answer for
private-sector unions might not be different. Id. at 2382 n.4 (“We do not suggest that the answer
must be different. We have previously construed the authorization of private-sector agency-shop
arrangements in National Labor Relations Act in a manner that is arguably content based.”); see
DiPietro, supra note117 (noting that section 760 was upheld only as applied to public-sector unions
and that regulation of private sector unions presents a different constitutional question that the
court did not address).
The failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to apply its ruling to both public- and private-sector
unions troubled one commentator:
[T]he Davenport Court could not find a basis to validate the § 760 with
respect to private-sector workers. This is troubling because it is difficult to
separate public- from private-sector labor unions. . . . If a state fails to outlaw
private-sector union-shops and union security agreements sanctioned by the
NLRA, it appears that just as much governmental coercion is present as the
Court has found in cases arising under public-sector bargaining statutes.
Private-sector employers and labor unions operating under the aegis of the
NLRA or the RLA were ceded authority by the Federal government to coerce
private sector dues payments from dissenting employees, enforceable
through the right to terminate workers for nonpayment of sues.
Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 707-08. Further, “public and private sector unions and their
respective revenues cannot be clearly divided since they are often both affiliate members of, and
contribute to the same national labor organization and share the same mission [and] because
approximately one-half of a typical union’s financial activity occurs at the national level.” Id. at 712.
127 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380 n.2 (2007) (“The only reason [the union’s] use of its member’s dues
was burdened is that respondent chose to comingle those dues with nonmembers’ agency fees.”).
128 State of Washington v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 130 P.3d 352, 354 (2006).
129 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378 (“Respondent [is] the exclusive bargaining agent for approximately
70,000 public education employees . . . .”).
130 Erwin Chermerinsky & Marci A. Hamilton, Nineteenth Annual Supreme Court Review: First
Amendment Decisions from the October 2006 Term, 23 TOURO L. REV. 741, 743 (2008) (“[N]on-union
members [have] the right to not have their dues used for political activities they did not agree with;
the Washington law fulfills that by requiring the affirmative opt-in. The Court did not say the
Constitution requires this, only that the State of Washington could require it, if it chose.”). That the
U.S. Supreme Court did not require the affirmative consent of nonmembers to non-chargeable
expenditures of union dues and fees troubled one commentator: “[T]he Court’s failure to require
prior consent . . . appears to dispute Madison’s view requiring consent before the ideological
burdens of membership can attach,” particularly in light of lower court determinations in Beck that
nearly 80% of union dues were not chargeable and in Lehnert that nearly 90% of dues were spent on
non-representational activity. See Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 709-10.
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discussed above involved “opt out” provisions, i.e., workers who object to expenditures
of their dues “opt out” of paying a portion of their fees and dues for political purposes.
The work imposed on the union by the Washington State “opt in” procedure will be
likely be more burdensome than “an opt-out” procedure. Rather than simply providing
the workers the opportunity to object to the expenditure, the union must convince the
worker to provide affirmative consent for political expenditures. This may be a difficult
task, particularly with those workers who were not willing to join the union in the first
place.131 Likewise, while the record does not contain a calculation or estimate of the
financial impact of an “opt out” and an “opt in” system, it appears likely that the “opt
in” system will produce a smaller pot of money for political expenditures than an “opt
out” system for two reasons. First, the “opt out” procedure permits the union to use the
dues of workers who do not receive or understand the form, misplace the form, simply
forget to complete the form, or fail to do so in a timely manner. The “opt-in” procedure
prevents the union from using those fees.132 Second, the “opt-in” procedures increase
administrative expenses, because the union is required to seek, obtain, and record the
affirmative consent and to refund the political portion of the fees to all nonmembers
who did not affirmatively agree.133

See Selmi, supra note 118, at 248 (“In most workplaces, non-members must affirmatively opt-out
of the fee structure as a means of manifesting their lack of consent, but the state of Washington
passed legislation requiring unions to gain the affirmative consent of the non-members before any
of their fees could be used for election-related purposes. Presumably very few non-members will
give their affirmative consent since if they were willing to provide their consent one would also
assume they would be willing to join the union.”).
132 The rebate checks paid to those who objected to expenditures for political purposes were
between $44 and $76 per person. State of Washington v. Washington Educ. A’n, 130 P.3d at 355. If
all 3,500 nonmembers failed to opt in, the financial impact to WEA would be range from $154,000 to
$266,000.
133 It is interesting to consider whether Davenport’s upholding the substitution of “opt-in”
provisions for “opt-out” provisions will pass muster in other First Amendment contexts. In doing
so, it is important to recall that Davenport determined the union has no First Amendment right to
collect dues and service charges through payroll deductions. Unlike Davenport, however, those
who might object to switching opt-in provisions for opt-out provisions likely have a recognized
First Amendment right that is negatively affected by the switch. This is illustrated by a recent news
report about a Rutgers University proposal to permit its undergraduate students to “opt-in” to the
payment of the subscription fee for the Daily Targum, the student newspaper, rather than
permitting the students to request a refund if they do not wish to subscribe. See Rita Giordano,
“Rutgers paper fights fee proposal,” PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, January 24, 2009, at B1, at
http://www.philly.com/philly/education/20090124_Rutgers_paper_fights_fee_proposal.html
(last visited Jan. 24, 2009) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen). According to the editor of
the Daily Targum, the proposal will “imperil the second-oldest college newspaper in the nation,”
because it will substantially diminish student funding for the newspaper. Id. In contrast, the
chairman of the Student Assembly favors the proposal, because “students shouldn't have to jump
through hoops to get their money back.” Id.
Notably, courts have recognized a First Amendment right to financial support of student
publications. In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
217, 233 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that First Amendment permits a public university to
charge students mandatory fees segregated from the tuition charge to fund extracurricular student
speech, provided viewpoint neutrality is employed in allocating funding to student organizations
engaging in such speech. The principal justification advanced for this decision is that universities
should be permitted to “determine that its mission is well served if students have the means to
engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political subjects in
131
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Fourth, U.S. Supreme Court’s determined that “unions have no constitutional
entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees.”134 While this appears to be
inconsistent of the Court’s previous statement in Street that the union should not be
sanctioned in favor of an employee who makes no complaint regarding the use if his or
her money,135 the petitioner-nonmembers argued, and respondent-WEA expressly
conceded, that a union has no constitutional right to collect an agency fee in the first
place.136 At first blush this concession appears somewhat surprising. Further reflection,

their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall.” Id. Once the University makes this
determination, it is “entitled to impose a mandatory fee to sustain an open dialogue to these ends.”
Id.; see Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843, 845-846 (1961) (holding that Wisconsin State Bar
Association rule requiring members to pay dues did not violate First Amendment rights of
members of the bar, where dues are utilized to raise quality of professional services and the record
does not disclose the fees are used to support political speech to which the members object).
134 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
135 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S. Ct. at 1803 (“The union receiving money exacted from an
employee under a union-shop agreement should not in fairness be subjected to sanctions in favor of
an employee who makes no complaint of the use of his money for such activities.”).
136 Brief for Petitioners, at 17, at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/06-07/051589_Petitioner.pdf (last visited May 13, 2009) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen) (“unions
have no constitutional right to collect fees from nonmembers.”); Brief for Respondents. at 46 at
http://www. abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/06-07/05-1657_Respondent.pdf (last
visited May 14, 2008) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen) (“Any union right to collect an
agency fee is a matter of statutory authorization, not constitutional principle, and a state is thus
constitutionally free to prohibit or decline to authorize an agency fee.”).
Having conceded the absence of a First Amendment right to collect an agency fee, the union
advanced alternate First Amendment arguments in support of its position: (1) once the fees were in
the union’s possession, U.S. Supreme Court’s campaign finance law precedents require the Court to
review the Washington statute under the strict scrutiny test; and (2) the Washington statute was an
impermissible content-based restriction, because it focused on election-related expenses. Both
arguments were rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court:
Realizing its argument based on Hudson was going to come up short, the
union turned to several more creative arguments. First, it claimed that once
the union had the fees in its possession, the Supreme Court’s campaign
finance law precedent, which frequently requires strict scrutiny on how those
funds are spent, would come into play. While clever, the Court found the
analogy inapt because the fees were only in the union’s possession because
the state had compelled the employees to provide the fees, and the
government coercion easily distinguished the Court’s prior campaign finance
jurisprudence. When the campaign finance argument ran aground, the
unions switched to another powerful first amendment doctrine, contending
that the state legislation was an impermissible content-based restriction
because it singled out election-related expenditures. This argument,
however, called into question the Court’s entire doctrine in the area, as the
union was effectively arguing that its use of nonmember fees could not be
regulated, or at least could not be regulated when it came to expressive
activity. In its early cases, including its decision in Hudson, the Court had
made clear that states could restrict the use of agency shop fees, and could, in
fact, impose specific regulation on the use of those fees for election-related
purposes.
Selmi, supra note 118, at 250.
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however, demonstrates it to be the correct conclusion for two principal reasons. To
begin with, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the First Amendment rights of labor
unions and their members are no different than those given to all individuals.137 Those
rights are “the right of an individual to speak freely, to advocate ideas, to associate with
others, and to petition his government for redress of grievances . . . [and] the right of
associations to engage in advocacy on behalf of their members.”138 It is difficult to
argue convincingly that the right to associate with others encompasses a constitutional
right to use for political purposes the compelled fees of nonmembers when they have
decided for whatever reason not to join the union. Secondly, U.S. Supreme Court
decisions upholding right to work laws belies the existence of a First Amendment right
of the union to collect fees and dues.139 In upholding those laws, the Court rejected a
lower court argument that the right of association somehow supports a constitutional
right to compel union membership to enhance the effectiveness of the union.140 The
Court has also determined “there is no constitutional duty to bargain collectively with
an exclusive bargaining agent,”141 and right to work laws do not interfere with First
Amendment rights.142 In short, unions have no supplemental First Amendment rights
by virtue of their representation of workers in the collective bargaining process
permitting it to collect the agency fee from the workers it represents.
By eviscerating any First Amendment entitlement on the part of the union to dues
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Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 99 S. Ct. 1826, 1827 (1979). The court noted:
[T]he First Amendment is not a substitute for the national labor relations
laws. The fact that procedures followed by a public employer in bypassing
the union and dealing directly with its members might well be unfair labor
practices were federal statutory law applicable hardly establishes that such
procedures violate the Constitution. The First Amendment right to associate
and to advocate ‘provides no guarantee that a speech will persuade or that
advocacy will be effective.’ The public employee surely can associate and
speak freely and petition openly, and he is protected by the First Amendment
from retaliation for doing so. But the First Amendment does not impose any
affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this
context, to recognize the association and bargain with it.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
139 See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 69 S. Ct. 251, 254 (1949)
(holding that state statutes in Nebraska and North Carolina prohibiting employers from entering
into contracts to exclude non-union members from employment do not violate the First
Amendment, because “[i]t is difficult to see how enforcement of this state policy could infringe the
freedom of speech of anyone, or deny to anyone the right to assemble or to petition for redress of
grievances. And appellants do not contend that the laws expressly forbid the full exercise of those
rights by unions or union members.”).
140 Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 99 S. Ct. at 1827.
141 Id. at 1828 n.2.
142 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 69 S. Ct. 251, 254 (1949) (“Nothing
in the language of [right to work] laws indicates a purpose to prohibit speech, assembly, or petition.
Precisely what these state laws do is to forbid employers acting alone or in concert with labor
organizations deliberately to restrict employment to none but union members.”); accord Am. Fed’n
of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 69 S. Ct. 258 (1948) (upholding the constitutionality of an Arizona
state constitutional amendment which prohibited employment discrimination against non-union
employees but not against union employees).
138
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and fees, the Court has removed any union interest against which to balance the
restrictions authorized by the state, thereby possibly giving the states unfettered right to
impose any additional restrictions on the union’s access to dues and fees it chooses,
including content-based restrictions. The only other countervailing interests that may
serve as a check on the restrictions a state may impose on union access to dues and fees
are those interests promoted by mandatory union representation: bringing order and
peace to labor relations and achieving efficiencies in negotiating and administering
collective bargaining agreements and settling disputes. State restrictions on union
access to dues and fees may presumably be challenged if those restrictions threaten
labor relations and efficiencies in collective bargaining and dispute resolution. Given
the severity of that test, however, perhaps unions might be better served by eschewing
state directed access to union dues and relying solely on the collective bargaining
agreements with employers to obtain dues and fees through payroll deduction.143
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF DAVENPORT
By not addressing certain issues, Davenport postpones questions that may have to
be addressed in the future. First, the U.S. Supreme Court did not review the union’s
collection of service fees in excess of those needed for collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment.144 This permits the union to avoid its Hudson
obligations as discussed in Part II above: (1) preliminarily estimating the proportion of
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses and reducing the dues charged the
nonmembers by the portion of nonchargeable expenses; (2) providing nonmembers
information which describes how the proportionate share of chargeable and
nonchargeable expenses was calculated; (3) including in the information disclosed the
estimated expenditures for collective bargaining and administration that benefited all
members and nonmembers alike and for which a fee could be charged; and (4)
providing nonmembers with the right to object to the union’s determination of what
expenses were chargeable and nonchargeable.
Notably, Hudson requires that
obligations (2) and (3) take place prior to step (4) so that the nonmember has sufficient
information to challenge those expenses that the union claims are chargeable.145 As
noted by one commentator:
[T]he mere collection of that portion of the agency fee that represents
expenditures for political activities rather than collective bargaining .
. . violates the First Amendment on its face, regardless whether

143 Union access to dues and fees of public sector employees is mandated in only half of the states.
Brief of Petitioners, at 18, at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/06-07/051589_Petitioner.pdf (last visited May 13, 2008) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen) (“In fact,
nearly half of the states do not authorize the assessment of compelled fees at all in the public
sector.”).
144 See Jaffe, supra. note 109, at 116-17.
145 Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 1076 (1986) (“Basic considerations of
fairness, as well as concern for the First Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that the potential
objectors be given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee. Leaving the
nonunion employee in the dark about the source of the figure for the agency fee - and requiring
them to object in order to receive information - does not adequately protect the careful distinctions
drawn in Abood.”). See Jaffe, supra note 109, at 129-30.
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employees are allowed to seek reimbursement by jumping through
the formal procedural hoops for opting out each year.146
The Washington State procedures upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court do not include
these provisions and a subsequent challenge to them may arise.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that the language in Street indicating that
dissent is not to be presumed is equally applicable to union shop and agency shop
organizations.147 Notably, however, Street involved a union shop arrangement, in
which all employees must be a member of the union as a condition of employment, and
some union members voluntarily agree to be associated with the union and its political
activities and others do not. Because there is no easy way to identify who is a voluntary
member and who is not in a union shop arrangement, it is fair to assume that dissent is
not to be presumed as to all union members and to require the nonvoluntary members
to come forward and notify the union of their dissent.148 In contrast, members of an
agency shop are not required to become members of the union, but are required only to
pay as a service fee that portion of union dues attributable to collective bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance adjustment. Because they elected not to become
members of the union, for whatever reasons, they are easily identified. Hence requiring
the union to take affirmative steps to protect their First Amendment rights is less
burdensome in the agency shop than in the union shop.149 In the former instance, the
union must contact only nonmembers to obtain their affirmative consent; in the latter
instance, the union must reach out to all members to obtain their affirmative consent.
Third, the U.S. Supreme Court justifies its conclusion that the union has no First
Amendment right to the service fees of nonmembers, because “it is uncontested that it
would be constitutional for Washington to eliminate agency fees entirely.”150 This
language may be an attempt to revive the “if we can ban it then we can regulate it”
approach utilized by the Court to resolve First Amendment issues in the commercial
speech arena. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,151 the U.S.
Supreme Court justified its upholding of a ban on advertising casino gambling aimed to
residents of Puerto Rico on the grounds the legislature could also decide to prohibit
gambling.152 The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter backed away from its “greaterincludes-the lesser” reasoning in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,153 noting that “it is
inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doctrine,” and that ”banning speech may
sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.”154 Perhaps the “greater-

See Jaffe, supra note 109, at 127.
Id. at 123.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 123-24.
150 Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. at 2378. In one commentator’s view, the use of
this language by the Court “effectively issued an invitation to all of the states” to eliminate agency
fees entirely. See Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 700.
151 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
152 Id. at 2979 (“[I]t is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition
of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of
allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising.”).
153 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
154 Id. at 1512. See Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek, Joe Camel and 44 Liquormart: Has the FDA
Gone Too Far,” 27 ACAD. LEGAL STUD. BUS. NAT’L PROC. 191, 193-94 (1998); Edward J. Schoen et al.,
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott: California Fruit Marketing Orders Prune the First Amendment, 10
146
147
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includes-the lesser” analysis has experienced a resurrection.
VI. CONCLUSION
Street and Abood and their progeny have created a fairly coherent body of
principles governing the First Amendment implications of unions’ use of employee fees
and service charges for political purposes. Such expenditures violate the First
Amendment rights of those employees who object, and the union is required to refund
that portion of the dues and fees used for political purposes plus accrued interest to
objecting employees and to reduce future dues and fee payments by the percentage
union expenditures for political and ideological purposes bears to total union
expenditures. In order that employees make an informed decision on whether or not to
object to the expenditures, the union must disclose the proportion of chargeable and
nonchargeable expenses, explain how that proportion was computed, disclose the
estimated expenditures for collective bargaining and administration that benefits all
members and nonmembers alike, and provide employees with the opportunity to
communicate their objections to the union. Further, union expenditures cannot be
deemed chargeable unless they are necessarily or reasonably incurred for, and germane
to, the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees
in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues, thereby advancing labor
peace and avoiding free riding. Finally, any dispute between the employee and the
union regarding about chargeable expenditures must be resolved by an impartial
decision maker in a reasonably prompt manner.
While Ysursis does not appear to have departed from these principles, Davenport
seems to have sidestepped them in upholding the “opt in” restrictions on the use of
nonmember dues and service fees for political or ideological purposes. Instead of
resolving the issues presented by applying those principles, the U.S. Supreme Court
rebutted the Washington State Supreme Court’s reasoning, disclaimed any First
Amendment right on the part of the union to collect fees and services, and approved the
adoption of more restrictive protections of the nonmembers’ First Amendment right not
to be compelled to support political views with which they disagree. The reason for
this, of course, is that the Court was not judging the constitutionality of how the union
handled objecting employees’ dues and fees (as was the case in Street and Abood and
their progeny), but was reviewing the constitutionality of the state’s enhanced
restrictions on the union’s handling objecting employees’ dues and fees. In Street and
Abood and their progeny, objecting employees claimed their First Amendment rights
were violated and they prevailed. In Davenport, the union claimed its rights were
violated and it did not prevail.155 Further, the intersection of Street and Abood and their
progeny with Davenport and its potential progeny will probably not occur, because
employees are not likely to challenge enhanced state-imposed restrictions making it

WIDENER J. PUB. L. 21, 55 (2000).
155 Notably, the unions’ First Amendment arguments were raised as a defense to the two lawsuits
brought respectively by the State of Washington and nonmembers of the union. See Selmi, supra
note 118, at 249 (“[G]iven that the union’s challenge arose as a defense, one might have expected
the Court to be relatively gentle in reversing the Washington Supreme Court’s decision but the
Court did not appear to be in a genteel mood. Indeed, in a unanimous opinion . . . the Court
seemed to wonder aloud how the union could have the audacity to bring this challenge, forgetting,
of course, that the challenge arose as a defense to two major lawsuits.”).
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harder for unions to access their dues and fees, and, lacking any First Amendment right
to access dues and fees, the union lacks standing to dispute those restrictions.
Nonetheless, by not upholding the Washington State statute on the grounds it
provided better protection of the objecting members’ First Amendment rights and by
overlooking the union’s collection of dues and fees without adhering to all of the
Hudson requirements, Davenport may have reached the right conclusion for the wrong
reasons in an opinion that potentially erodes First Amendment protections accorded
nonmembers of an agency shop not to be charged service fees in excess of collective
bargaining costs.156 If so, except for providing the foundation for the Ysursa decision,
Davenport hopefully “will be remembered and relied on primarily for its result, not for
its reasoning,” and “future cases will apply First Amendment principles with greater
vigor,”157 particularly when the employment of the opt-in provisions restricts the first
amendment rights of the parties upon whom the restrictions are imposed.

156
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See Jaffe, supra. note 109, at 131.
Id.

